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1. Introduction
Liberalization of the telecommunications services market
transformed so far monopolistic market into competitive
one. However it is a specific competition because market
players are also forced (by the telecommunications low and
decisions of the regulators) into cooperation: networks of
the operators ought to be interconnected. For these rea-
sons telecommunications market is not only competitive,
but also cooperative.
Cursory analysis leads us to conclusion, that the boundary
between the issues of competition and cooperation runs
the same way as the boundary between the retail and the
wholesale market. However more careful analysis shows
that it should not be true. In fact competition is not an
opposing part to the cooperation: these concepts comes
from different “layers” of interaction between players.
The article discusses three layers, that defines the complex-
ity of interaction between players in market games: pos-
sibility of concluding enforceable agreements outside the
formal rules of the game, the structure of the payoff ma-
trix, the goals of the players, and explains the essence of
the important phenomenon that occurs on each of them.
2. Simple Theoretical Model
of a Market Game
Let us describe the market game in the concepts of game
theory. Every market participator can be treated as a player,
which has his own strategy of playing (e.g., prices on
the retail market, interconnection fees on the wholesale
market, etc.). The players evaluate their decisions (set
strategies) by the single-criteria or aggregated, multiple-
criteria goal function, which can be called as their payoff
function. The value of the payoff function depend on the
strategies set by each player in the game.
Table 1
Relationship between concepts of strategy
and outcomes of payoff function
Strategies b1 b2 b3 b4
a1
...
a2 . . . . . . . . . . . . [V A3 (a2),V B2 (b3)] . . . . . .
a3
...
a4
...
For the case of two players it is useful to illustrate relation
between strategies and payoff functions in the form of the
so called payoff matrix. Table 1 illustrates a simple payoff
matrix for two market players – A and B. Player A chooses
one of four strategies: a1, a2, a3, a4, and player B one
of b1, b2, b3, b4. Choosing the strategy ai by player A
and b j by player B results in obtaining V Aj (ai) by player A
and V Bi (b j) by player B.
3. Distinction for the sake of the Way
of Setting a Solution
From the early work of John Nash [1] differentiation be-
tween cooperative and non-cooperative games starts in
game theoretical analysis. In non-cooperative games play-
ers are unable to conclude enforceable agreements outside
the formal rules of the game. Cooperative games allow
such agreements1. Actually, Nash also assumed that in
a non-cooperative game, the players will be unable to com-
1Nash suggests that non-cooperative games are more basic, that coop-
erative games may fruitfully be analyzed by reformulating them as non-
cooperative ones and by solving for the Nash equilibria [2]. This approach
has come to be known as the Nash program [1]. It allows unification of the
theory and enables better understanding of the different solution concepts
that have been proposed in cooperative theory.
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municate with each other. Yet, as it was noticed by Harold
W. Kuhn [1], this would be a needlessly restrictive assump-
tion. For if the players cannot enter into enforceable agree-
ments, then their ability to communicate will be of no real
help toward a cooperative outcome.
Such differentiation – differentiation on the level of pos-
sibility to conclude enforceable agreements – explains us
most of all the way of setting the result of the game.
Such two different ways – with and without agreements
– have found reflection into two different theoretical meth-
ods of solving games which are now called Nash solution
(for cooperative games) [2] and Nash equilibrium (for non-
cooperative ones) [3], [4].
Competition is the relation between two or more sub-
jects (players) which arises when such players strives for
the same and limited goods. So in terms of game the-
ory such relation is well described by model of zero-sum
(or constant-sum) game [2]: the more one player gets the
more the other (others) should loose. An example of such
game we have in Table 2.
Table 2
Competitive, zero-sum game
Strategies b1 b2
a1 [–1, 1] [4, –4]
a2 [2, –2] [–3, 3]
So using the above mentioned concepts we should say
that popular distinction: cooperative – wholesale market
and competitive – retail market is not too precise. Rather
we should say: cooperative – wholesale market and non-
cooperative retail market2.
4. Distinction for the sake
of the Structure of the Payoff Matrix
Another concepts useful for understanding discussed issues
comes from the theory of negotiations [4]. Negotiations
are in fact cooperative game (as on the wholesale telecom-
munications services market). In every negotiations, where
are discussed at least two different issues, and where pref-
erences of the parts are not strictly the same, it is possible
to engage the negotiators into a process which is called in-
tegration. During it parts tries to find such correlation be-
tween their preferences which enables increasing the size
of the “cake” before dividing it. In fact such process bases
on mutual exchange less preferable issues (or their parts)
on more preferable ones. Process of dividing such “cake”
(occurring during the integrative process or not) is called
distributive, and so in fact it is exact competitive process.
Saying in terms of game theory or decision support inte-
grative process means seeking for effective, Pareto-optimal
2If really decisions on the retail market are made by players without
making any (public or tacit) agreements.
solutions [5], whilst distributive process means making ac-
tions for choosing one of two different (and differently
preferable by players) solutions (effective or not). It is
interesting to notice, that zero-sum game is a game, where
every result is Pareto-optimal, and so there exist a place
only for distributive process.
In negotiations distributive process is the only if negotia-
tions concern only one issue [4]. In such situations there
is no place for any integration, for increasing the size of
the “cake”. Such “cake” can be only divided and the more
one part gets the more the other looses. So every solution,
every division is Pareto-optimal. However it is true only
if the whole “cake” was divided, if “no gold was left on
the table” [6], [7] (strictly speaking only such situations
can be modeled as a zero-sum games). If it is possible to
exclude some part of the “cake” from the division (from
the distributive process), then we have place for some-
thing like de-integrative process which is strictly opposite
to the integrative one. An example of such game we have
in Table 3.
Let us assume, that the values of outcomes corresponds
to the share of the divided (distributed) object. In this
game there are three effective solutions, that “divide the
whole cake”: [0.3, 0.7], [0.7, 0.3] and [0.5, 0.5]. The re-
sult [0.4, 0.4] is not effective, and means “leaving on the
table some gold” (0.2 part of the object), and so choosing it
(if players does know the effective results) can be treated
as a result of a de-integrative process.
Table 3
Game with possibility of de-integration
Strategies b1 b2
a1 [0.4, 0.4] [0.5, 0.5]
a2 [0.3, 0.7] [0.7, 0.3]
Is there any opposite process to the distribution in such
games? Generally we say that this is concentration, but in
a game it means no decision, giving up any solution, and so,
from our point of view it is not an interesting case. However
as we have games where there is only place for distributive
process (zero-sum games), so we have games where there
is no place for any distribution, only an integration (and
de-integration) can take place. An example of such game
we have in Table 4, where – assuming that both players aim
Table 4
Game with no place for distributive process
Strategies b1 b2
a1 [1, 1] [4, 4]
a2 [2, 2] [3, 3]
only at maximizing their own payoffs – preferences of both
players between individual solutions are exactly the same.
If we assume that players aims at choosing an effective
result, and are able (during the integrative process) to doing
so, there is no place for distributive process, because there
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is only one effective result in this game. More over making
a comparison between any two different solutions we have
that always one of them is betters for both players.
In some cases the place for distributive process can arise
if integrative process finishes without finding the only ef-
fective solution. An example of such game we have in
Table 5.
Table 5
Game with a place for distributive process only if
integrative process finishes without finding the only
effective result
Strategies b1 b2
a1 [1, 1] [4, 4]
a2 [3, 2] [2, 3]
If for example during a negotiations, assuming that play-
ers aims at maximizing their own payoffs players didn’t
find (during an integrative process) a solution [4, 4], than
a place for distributive process would arise: players would
bargain on selections one of two, differently preferable so-
lutions: [3, 2] and [2, 3].
Analogically it is also possible that there would be no place
for a distributive process because of the same reason. We
have this in a game as in Table 6.
Table 6
Game without a place for distributive process if players
didn’t find all effective solutions
Strategies b1 b2
a1 [1, 1] [2, 2]
a2 [3, 4] [4, 3]
If, for example during the negotiations players found only
two or three results (but only one effective: [3, 4] or [4, 3]),
then there would be no place for a distributive process.
It seems to be useful to define a single type of integrative-
distributive games, encompassing three before mentioned
cases:
– game with possibility of de-integration,
– game with a place for distribution only if integrative
process finishes without finding the only effective re-
sult,
– game without a place for distribution if players didn’t
find all effective results.
In fact an integrative process can occur if there exists
a place for improving a given solution for every of the
players at a given stage of a game. Starting from any inef-
fective result always such possibility exists. In every above
mentioned cases there exists at least one ineffective result,
so such situation occurs. Also in every cases there are at
least two incomparable solutions – solutions, that any of
them is better for every of the players – so there exists
a place for a distributive process (it’s true even if there
exists only one effective result in a game, because players
should not know, which result is effective, an can decide
to finish integrative process after finding two different and
incomparable ineffective results).
So, respectively to the structure of the payoff matrix of
a given game we can distinguish the following different
types of games:
– distributive games: games with no place for integra-
tive process (strictly competitive games, zero-sum or
constant-sum games),
– integrative games: games with no place for distribu-
tive process (not competitive games),
– integrative-distributive games.
Having this we can say that wholesale telecommunications
services market, respectively to structure of the payoff ma-
trix can be treated as distributive, integrative or integrative-
distributive cooperative game. Analogically retail telecom-
munications services market, can be treated as distributive,
integrative or integrative-distributive non-cooperative game.
So we see that as on the retail (non-cooperative) so on the
wholesale (cooperative) market a place for a distributive
process – a real competition – can exist. Also we see,
that on the retail (non-cooperative) market there can exist
a place for something like integration, for increasing the
size of the “cake”, for finding such solution which would
be better for every of the players than another accessible
solution.
However there is a difference between integrative and dis-
tributive processes on retail and wholesale markets. Such
difference comes from the way of setting a result: coop-
erative on the wholesale markets and non-cooperative on
the retail markets. On the wholesale markets integrative
and distributive process can proceed during one, single
game (during a one round of the negotiations by making
temporary decisions). On the retail markets such process
proceeds only if a game is repeated (by making real deci-
sions). Moreover, on the wholesale markets integrative and
distributive processes can proceed independently. On the
retail markets such integration and distribution are realized
simultaneously: by making a decision by the last mover in
the game3.
5. Distinction for the sake of the Aims
of the Players
Until to the first works of John C. Harsanyi on the
games with incomplete information (so called I-games
[8]–[11]) it was generally assumed, that in any games play-
ers have all information, necessary to define the strategic
form of a given game (its basic mathematical structure).
3Partially integration and distribution are realized also by a decisions of
the first (and eventually next, but not last) mover, whose decisions creates
the finale alternatives to the last mover.
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Harsanyi showed that in many real situations this is too
hard assumption. Players often does not know: the form of
their own or the other player’s payoff function, the set of
the accessible strategies, the scope of information that the
other player possess, etc.
In real situations there exists one thing, that really can be
interpreted as a part of a strategic form of a game, yet
seems to be simple to pass over. General assumption in
game theory is that players aims at maximizing their own
payoff functions. These functions – interpreted as utility
functions – are formulated in such way, that their maxi-
mization leads to obtaining the appointed goal. Such utility
function describes how good for a given player (under his
subjective preferences) is the obtained objective state. Here
arises very subtle problem.
Let us consider simple example. In a given game there
are only two different results [3, 4] and [1, 3]. The values
reflects the profits in money of players A and B. Let us
assume, that both players prefer to get more money than
less, and that their utility is proportional to the amount of
gotten many. So such results expressed in terms of utility
have the same form: [3, 4] and [1, 3]. The answer, which
result should be chosen by players seems to by simple:
effective [3, 4]. However it is true only, if – as it is usually
assumed in game theory analysis, and us during formulation
of utility function for these results – players evaluate the
results only by the value of money, they get themselves.
This assumption can be called as assumption of neutral
way of playing, by players: players are interesting only in
evaluation the values gotten by themselves.
In market games such assumption is too hard. Evaluation
solely the values gotten by itself is a good approach only
in short term. In long term players should take into con-
sideration relative values, because after crossing a certain
distance between the positions of the players on the market,
such distance can increase very quickly: strong player be-
comes stronger, weak becomes weaker. So in our example
we could assume, that players evaluate the obtained results
not by the values of money obtained by themselves but as
a difference between the values gotten by both players. So
for player A the result [3, 4] may have utility 3− 4 = −1,
and for result [1, 3]: 1− 3 = −2. For player B the utili-
ties would be exactly opposite: for [3, 4]: 4− 3 = 1, and
for [1, 3]: 3−1 = 2. These new utility function defines in
fact different solutions (in terms of utility): for the val-
ues [3, 4] now the result in terms of utility is [−1, 1]
and for [1, 3] – [−2, 2]. Both of them are effective.
Such aspirations of players can be called as antagonistic.
Generally, when we say antagonism of the player, we mean
of the situation, when the player aims not only in maximiza-
tion of his own payoff function (defined as an evaluation
only his own vale), but also in minimization of the other
player’s payoff function (defined in the same way). As an
opposition we can formulate an aspiration which can be
called as altruistic. In such a case a given player would
aspire to maximize the payoff function of the other player.
Now we formulate in mathematical form some examples of
the antagonistic and altruistic way of playing, which can we
called antagonistic and altruistic aims. For the simplicity
we formulate them only for the player B.
5.1. Examples of Antagonistic Aims
Antagonistic aim of player B reflects his approach to his
own payoff function and to player’s A payoff function.
There could be many of such aims. Below we will present
some of them.
Let’s ˘bk be the (kth) antagonistic strategy (move) of
player B. The most antagonistic move of player B is such,
that B aims first of all at minimization of the A’s payoff
function, and he considers his own payoff function only in
a case of ambiguity (two or more different strategies give
the same and the smallest outcome to player A). This can
be expressed as follows:
˘bk(ai) = arglexminj
{
V Aj (ai),−V Bi (b j)
}
. (1)
The least antagonistic move of player B is such, that B aims
first of all at maximization of his own payoff function and in
the case of ambiguity (two or more different strategies give
the same – and the highest – outcome to him) he chooses
this, that gives the smallest outcome to player A. This can
be expressed as follows:
˘bk(ai) = arglexmaxj
{
V Bi (b j),−V Aj (ai)
}
. (2)
Strategies (1) and (2) determine (for a given strategy of
player A) the range of outcomes that player A can obtain in
a situation that player B plays in an antagonistic way. Below
some other antagonistic aims of player B are described.
Player B can aim at maximizing of his own payoff func-
tion and at minimizing of player’s B payoff function with
different power to both of them expressed by a weight co-
efficient α . In such a way a general form of a formula (1)
can be obtained4:
˘bk(ai) = argmaxj
{
α ·V Bi (b j)− (1−α) ·VAj (ai)
}
. (3)
Strategy (3) can be interpreted as aiming at maximizing the
difference between the outcomes of player B and A.
Player B can also aim at obtaining assumed value of the
difference – δ between the outcomes of the players, and
after that at maximizing of his own payoff function. This
can be expressed as the following lexicographic optimiza-
tion task:
˘bk(ai) = arglexmaxj
{
∆i j,V Bi (b j)
}
, (4)
where:
∆i j = min
{
δ ,α ·V Bi (b j)− (1−α) ·VAj (ai)
}
.
Another kind of antagonistic strategy can be expressed as
aiming at maximization of an own payoff function with si-
multaneous aiming at ensuring that the other player’s payoff
4The formula (1) can be generalized to (3) by assumption α ≫ (1−α).
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function does not exceed assumed threshold value ν . This
can be expressed as the following optimization task:
˘bk(ai) = argmaxj
{
V Bi (b j)
}
, (5)
under constraint:
V Aj (ai)≤ ν.
There is a possibility to make an opposite approach: min-
imization of the player’s A payoff function, under assump-
tion that the outcome of player B would not be smaller then
the threshold value ν:
˘bk(ai) = argminj
{
V Aj (ai)
}
, (6)
under constraint:
V Bi (b j)≥ ν.
In the case of using strategy (5) or (6) it is important to
asses correctly the value of the threshold ν in order to
assure that the appropriate optimization problems will have
a solution.
It is possible to express the antagonistic approach of the
player B with using the concepts of reference point method
[5], [12] by introducing reservation and aspiration point for
the payoff functions of the player A and B. Payoff func-
tion of the player A will be treated here as the minimized
criterion and the player’s B as the maximized criterion. Par-
tial achievement function for player B is then expressed as
follows:
ηB
(
V Bi (b j)
)
=

β (VBi (b j)−V B)
V B−V B
for V Bi (b j) < V B
V Bi (b j)−V B
V B−V B
for V B ≤V Bi (b j)≤V
B
1+ α(V
B
i (b j)−V
B
)
V B−V B
for V B < V Bi (b j) ,
(7)
where V B represents reservation point, and V B represents
aspiration point for the payoff function V Bi (b j) of player B.
Partial achievement function for player A is expressed as
ηA
(
V Aj (ai)
)
=

1+ α(V
Aj (ai)−V
A
)
V A−V A
for V Aj (ai) < V
A
V Aj (ai)−VA
V A−V A
for V A ≤V Aj (ai)≤V A
β (V Aj (ai)−V A)
V A−V A
for V A < V Aj (ai) .
(8)
In such a case antagonistic response (antagonistic strategy)
of player B can be defined as the following formulae:
˘bk(ai) = argmaxj
{
min
{
ηA
(
V Aj (ai)
)
,ηB
(
V Bi (b j)
)}
+ρ ·
(
ηA
(
V Aj (ai)
)
+ ηB
(
V Bi (b j)
))}
. (9)
5.2. Examples of Altruistic Aims
Let’s b̂k be the (kth) altruistic strategy (move) of player B.
The most altruistic move of player B is such, that B aims
first of all at maximization of the A’s payoff function, and
he considers his own payoff function only in a case of am-
biguity (two or more different strategies give the same and
the highest outcome to player A). This can be expressed as
b̂k(ai) = arglexmaxj
{
V Aj (ai),V Bi (b j)
}
. (10)
The least altruistic move of player B is such, that B aims
first of all at maximization of his own payoff function and in
the case of ambiguity (two or more different strategies give
the same – and the highest – outcome to him) he chooses
this, that gives the highest outcome to player A. This can
be expressed as follows:
b̂k(ai) = arglexmaxj
{
V Bi (b j),V Aj (ai)
}
. (11)
Strategies (10) and (11) determine (for a given strategy of
player A) the range of outcomes that player A can obtain in
a situation that player B plays in an altruistic way. Below
some other altruistic moves of player B are described.
Player B can aim at maximizing of his own payoff func-
tion and at maximizing of player’s B payoff function with
different power to both of them expressed by a weight co-
efficient α . In such a way a general form of a formula (10)
can be obtained5:
b̂k(ai) = argmaxj
{
α ·V Bi (b j)+ (1−α) ·VAj (ai)
}
. (12)
Strategy (12) can be interpreted as aiming at maximizing
the sum of the outcomes of player B and A.
Another kind of altruistic strategy can be expressed as aim-
ing at maximization of an own payoff function with simul-
taneous aiming at ensuring that the other player’s payoff
function will be not smaller than the assumed threshold
value ν . This can be expressed as the following optimiza-
tion task:
b̂k(ai) = argmaxj
{
V Bi (b j)
}
, (13)
under constraint:
V Aj (ai)≥ ν.
There is a possibility to make an opposite approach: maxi-
mization of the player’s A payoff function, under assuming
that the outcome of player B would not be smaller then the
threshold value ν:
b̂k(ai) = argmaxj
{
V Aj (ai)
}
, (14)
under constraint:
V Bi (b j)≥ ν.
5The formula (10) can be generalized to (12) by assumption α ≫ (1−α).
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In the case of using strategy (13) or (14) it is important
to correctly asses the value of the threshold ν in order to
assure that the appropriate optimization problems will have
a solution.
It is possible to express the altruistic approach of the
player B with using the concepts of reference point method
by introducing reservation and aspiration point for the pay-
off functions of the player A and B. Payoff functions of the
player A and B are treated here as the maximized criterion.
Partial achievement function for player B is then expres-
sed as follows:
ηB
(
V Bi (b j)
)
=

β (V Bi (b j)−VB)
V B−V B
for V Bi (b j) < V B
V Bi (b j)−V B
V B−V B
for V B ≤V Bi (b j)≤V
B
1+ α(V
B
i (b j)−V
B
)
V B−V B
for V B < V Bi (b j) ,
(15)
where V B represents reservation point, and V B repre-
sents aspiration point for the payoff function V Bi (b j) of
player B.
Partial achievement function for player A is expressed as
ηA
(
V Aj (ai)
)
=

β (VAj (ai)−V A)
V A−V A
for V Aj (ai) < V A
V Aj (ai)−V A
V A−V A
for V A ≤V Aj (ai)≤V
A
1+ α(V
A
j (ai)−V
A
)
V A−V A
for V A < V Aj (ai) .
(16)
In such a case altruistic move of player B can be defined
as the following formulae:
b̂k(ai) = argmaxj
{
min
{
ηA
(
V Aj (ai)
)
,ηB
(
V Bi (b j)
)}
+ρ ·
(
ηA
(
V Aj (ai)
)
+ ηB
(
V Bi (b j)
))}
. (17)
5.3. Examples of Irrational Aims
As an irrational way of playing we mean such, that a given
player aims most of all at minimizing his own payoff func-
tion. It should be stressed that as in antagonistic so in
altruistic ways of playing there is a place for deteriorating
of the own payoff. However it is rather a consequence of
the main goal: decreasing (in antagonistic) or increasing
(in altruistic) the payoff of the other player. If such deteri-
orating of the own payoff couldn’t find any justification in
such mainly antagonistic or altruistic aims, than we should
treat it as irrational.
Here we present some examples of irrational aims:
˜bk(ai) = arglexminj
{
V Bi (b j),V Aj (ai)
}
, (18)
˜bk(ai) = arglexminj
{
V Aj (ai),V Bi (b j)
}
, (19)
˜bk(ai) = arglexmaxj
{
V Aj (ai),−V Bi (b j)
}
, (20)
˜bk(ai) = arglexmaxj
{
−V Bi (b j),V Aj (ai)
}
, (21)
˜bk(ai) = arg minj
{
V Aj (ai)
}
, (22)
under constraint:
V Bi (b j)≤ ν ,
˜bk(ai) = arg maxj
{
V Aj (ai)
}
, (23)
under constraint:
V Bi (b j)≤ ν.
5.4. Context Relative Aim
Let us look once again on two before defined strategies:
˘bk(ai) = argmaxj
{
α ·V Bi (b j)− (1−α) ·VAj (ai)
}
(24)
and
b̂k(ai) = argmaxj
{
α ·V Bi (b j)+ (1−α) ·VAj (ai)
}
. (25)
It was said that antagonistic strategy (24) can be interpreted
as aiming at maximizing the difference between the out-
comes of player B and A. Altruistic strategy (25) can be
interpreted as aiming at maximizing the sum of the out-
comes of player B and A.
Looking on these we can simply formulate a strategy which
in fact can’t be unambiguously classified as antagonistic or
altruistic, and which is not a irrational one. We mean of
a strategy defined as minimization of the difference between
payoffs:
bk(ai) = argminj
{
α ·V Bi (b j)− (1−α) ·VAj (ai)
}
. (26)
Minimization of the difference between payoffs seems to
be an example of the altruistic strategy: a given player (B)
is willing to decrease his own outcome and at the same
time to increase the outcome of the other player, in order
to ensure the smallest difference between them. However
Table 7
A game where minimization of the difference
between the outcome of player B and A can’t be
interpreted as an altruistic aim
Strategies b1 b2
a1 [1, 1] [2, 3]
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in some cases such aim gives a solution which should be
interpreted as a result of antagonistic or irrational aim. Let
us consider a game with payoff matrix like in Table 7.
For the simplicity we assumed that there is only one
strategy of player A. Aim defined by strategy (26) leads to
the result: [1, 1], which minimizes the difference between
the payoffs. However this solution can’t be interpreted as
a result of altruism of the player B. In fact the payoff of
player A is worse than it would be for a [2, 3]. If however
a payoff matrix would be like in Table 8, then aim defined
by strategy (26) leads to [3, 3], which can be interpreted
as a result of altruistic move of player B.
Table 8
A game where minimization of the difference
between the outcome of player B and A can be
interpreted as an altruistic aim
Strategies b1 b2
a1 [3, 3] [2, 3]
So we see, that interpretation of strategy (26) depends on
the form of the payoff matrix, and so is context relative.
This can also lead to misleading the real motives of choos-
ing given strategies by players.
5.5. Outside the Mathematical Structure of a Game:
Malicious and Kind Aims
Now we ask an important question: are aims of the players
(antagonistic or altruistic) a part of a basic mathematical
structure of a game or are they outside it? Or in different
way: can we transform games with such aims of players
into games with new payoff function and neutral aims of
the players? The answer seems to be ambiguous.
From one point of view we can say like that: the aim of
a player can be simply expressed in values of a utility. In
fact the above mentioned antagonistic and altruistic aims
have defined real utility of any solutions, described in terms
of utility with neutral aim.
Let us remind the before considered example. In a given
game there are only two different results: [3, 4] and [1, 3].
The values reflect the profits in money of players A and B.
Both players prefer to get more money than less, and their
utility is proportional to the amount of gotten money (neu-
tral aim). So such results expressed in terms of utility have
the same form: [3, 4] and [1, 3]. However if for example
player A aims into an antagonistic aim defined as aiming
at maximization the difference between the outcomes of
the players, than in fact he has different utility function
(payoff function), defined as a difference between the util-
ity values expressed with assumption of a neutral aim. So
we can incorporate an antagonistic aim of player A into
his payoff function, and treat this new situation as a game
with neutral aims of the players. In such a game the so-
lutions will be expressed in form [3− 4, 4] = [−1, 4] and
[1−3, 3] = [−2, 3]. So we see that different than neutral
aims of the players can be simply incorporated into a pay-
off function of a player and so can be treated as a part of
a basic mathematical structure of a game.
However there are two aims of the players, which may cause
a problem with incorporation them into a payoff function
of a players, and so which seems to be outside the basic
mathematical structure of a game. We call them: malicious
and kind way of playing.
A malicious way of playing means that a given player de-
fines his own aim as the opposite of the aim of the other
player. A kind way of playing means that a given player
defines his own aim as an exact realization of the other’s
player aim. Of special importance is here the word defines.
Such word justifies why such way of playing are not called
merely as opposing and convergent. For example, if both
players are going to play in the least antagonistic way, and
so aims at choosing the following strategies:
˘bk(ai) = arglexmaxj
{
V Bi (b j),−V Aj (ai)
}
, (27)
a˘k(b j) = arglexmaxi
{
V Aj (ai),−V Bi (b j)
}
, (28)
the aims:
aimB = lexmaxj
{
V Bi (b j),−V Aj (ai)
}
,
aimA = lexmax
i
{
V Aj (ai),−V Bi (b j)
}
are really opposing, but we can say that (for example)
player A plays in a malicious way if he explicitly defines
his aim as
aimA =∼ aimB ,
where ∼ means opposing of (independently of in which
way aimB would be defined). Analogically we could say
that player A plays in a kind way only if he explicitly defines
his aim as
aimA = aimB .
Malicious and kind aims can be also incorporated into
payoff functions of players. If for example player A aims
at a neutral aim defined as maximizing of his own payoff
function V A, then a malicious aim of player B can be in-
corporated into his payoff function by putting V B = −V A,
and treated this function as a function in game with a neu-
tral aim. Analogically we can express a kind aim of
player B by putting V B = V A. So we see that games with
malicious aims can be treated as a distributive games (zero-
sum, strictly competitive) with neutral aims, and games
with kind aims as an integrative game (with no place for
any distribution).
However a problem arises when both players would like
to play in a malicious (or kind) way. How to define their
aims in terms of the value of the payoff function? What
is a basic mathematical structure of such a game, under
assumption that players play in a neutral way? We cant
find a satisfying answer on these questions.
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6. Opposition and Convergence of Aims
and Problems with Cooperation
Our earlier analysis appointed three important aspects that
define the relation between players, and in fact define the
real game:
1. The way of setting a final solution, which can be:
– cooperative: players are able to conclude en-
forceable agreements outside the formal rules
of the game,
– non-cooperative: players are unable to conclude
enforceable agreements outside the formal rules
of the game.
2. The structure of the payoff matrix, that define the
game as:
– distributive: game with no place for integrative
process (strictly competitive game, zero-sum or
constant-sum game),
– integrative: game with no place for distributive
process (not competitive game),
– integrative-distributive: there exists a place as
for integration so for distribution.
3. The aims of the players, which can be:
– neutral: a given player is interesting only in his
own payoffs and aims at maximizing it,
– antagonistic: a given player aims at minimizing
the payoff function of the other player,
– altruistic: a given player aims at maximizing
the payoff function of the other player,
– irrational: a given player aims at minimizing
of his own payoff function,
– context-relative: a given player aims at mini-
mization of the difference between payoffs of
the players,
– malicious: a given player tries to thwart another
player’s plans,
– kind: a given player tries to help in realizing
another player’s plans.
Now we will analyze the relation between such aspects.
Players decide to play or are forced (more precisely: should
be forced) into playing in cooperative way only if it leads
to more effective or more fair solution than gotten during
a non-cooperative playing. Increasing effectiveness of the
solution comes from integrative process. Increasing fair-
ness of the solution is related with the distributive process.
Integration as a process of increasing the “size of a cake”
is profitable for both players. Distribution, as a process
of dividing such “cake” always mean that the more one
player gets the more the other should loose. So increasing
the fairness of the solution always mean that during it one
player will get more and the other will lose. So we can say,
that cooperation would be always more simple and more
natural in integrative games than in distributive games. In
a integrative-distributive games cooperation will be desir-
able by a given player only if he hoped that he got more
during an integrative process than he could probably lose
during a distributive one. Of course a player will desire
a cooperation if he hoped that he increases his payoffs also
during a cooperative-distributive process.
So we can say, the more integrative structure of the payoff
matrix the simpler cooperation between players. Analog-
ically the more distributive structure of the payoff matrix
the more difficult cooperation, the strongest incentive for
one of the players to play in a non-cooperative way.
Interesting relation occurs between the aims of the players
and the process of cooperation. Generally we can say: the
more convergent aims of the players the simpler coopera-
tion, the more opposing aims – the more difficult cooper-
ation. So we should ask: which aims are convergent, and
which are opposing?
It is obvious that if one player played in a malicious way
then real cooperation would be impossible (one player
would like to get exactly opposing solution then the other).
If one player played in a kind way then cooperation would
be very simple (both players would like to get exactly the
same solution). Paradoxically when both players played
in kind way then cooperation may be difficult because of
problems with definition of real aim.
It is interesting that also antagonistic aims of the players
can make cooperation simple. In fact antagonistic move of
one player can be the most desirable from the other player
point of view, so antagonistic aim can be treated not as an
opposing but convergent.
Let us consider the following example.
The pay off matrix is like in Table 9.
Table 9
Convergent antagonistic aims
Strategies b1 b2
a1 [1, 3] [3, 4]
a2 [2, 4] [4, 5]
Let players aim at realizing the following antagonistic goals:
• Player A: maximization of his own payoff function
under constraint that the payoff of the player B will
be not higher than 4.
• Player B: maximization of his own payoff function
under constraint that the difference between the pay-
offs of the players will be not smaller than 2 (with
advantage of the payoff of player A).
Under such assumption, both players would like to set a so-
lution [2, 4]. Under such aims of the players it is the best
result in this game for both players, so cooperation in this
case would be very simple. Obviously cooperation would
94
Cooperative and Non-cooperative, Integrative and Distributive Market Games with Antagonistic and Altruistic, Malicious and Kind Ways of Playing
be also simple if both players played in neutral or altruistic
way. In such cases both players would like to set a solu-
tion [4, 5]. However if player A played in antagonistic way
and player B in neutral or altruistic, then cooperation could
be difficult, because both players would like to set different
solution.
This example shows also that in the case of antagonis-
tic aims of both players we have something like chang-
ing the meaning of effectiveness: both players prefer [2, 4]
over [4, 5].
The above discussed example shows us, that in some cases
antagonism of the players can make cooperation simpler.
It is interesting, that in some cases cooperation with antag-
onistic aims of both players can be simpler even than in
the case of altruistic aims of both of them (not only one of
them). Let us consider the following example. The payoff
matrix in a game is like in Table 10.
Table 10
Difficult cooperation in the case of altruism
of the players
Strategies b1 b2
a1 [6, 5] [2, 5]
a2 [2, 4] [5, 6]
The players can aim at antagonistic goals:
• Player A: maximization of his own payoff function
under constraint that the payoff of the player B will
be not higher than 4.
• Player B: maximization of his own payoff function
under constraint that the difference between the pay-
offs of the players will be not smaller than 2 (with
advantage of the payoff of player B).
If they are not afraid to disclose them, then they simply
find a solution [2, 4], as a satisfying one.
However if the players aims at altruistic aims defined as
maximizing the own payoff function under assumption that
the other player’s payoff would be not smaller than 5, then
they would have a problem, which solution should be chose.
Player A prefers [6, 5] and player B prefers [5, 6], and if
they would not change theirs aims the negotiations may be
very strong. In fact above defined antagonistic aims (in
this game) were here more convergent than such altruistic
aims. So we see that in some cases cooperation among
antagonistic players may be simpler than between altruistic
ones.
Our conclusion can be justified also in different way. If we
transform a game with antagonistic or altruistic aims into
a game with new payoff function (which reflects such aims)
and neutral aims, then we find that cooperation was simple
there where was only one effective solution (where there
was no place for distribution). Analogically cooperation
was difficult where in such new game (with neutral aims)
there was more then one effective result.
7. Summary and Final Conclusions
As it was said in the introduction, cursory analysis of the
telecommunications services market leads to conclusion,
that the boundary between the issues of competition and
cooperation runs the same way as the boundary between
the retail and the wholesale market. Now we see that com-
petition is not an opposing part to the cooperation: in fact
these concepts comes from different “layers” of interac-
tion between players. The concept of cooperation explains
the way of setting a final result, while competition is in
fact a distribution process and its existence depends on the
structure of the payoff matrix and the aims of the players.
So it is possible, that under some kinds of payoff functions
and aims of the players real competition can take place
as on the retail so on the wholesale markets. It is also
possible (even if only theoretically), that competition take
place only on (cooperative) wholesale market, because on
(non-cooperative) retail market the structure of the payoff
matrix and the aims of the players may make a place only
for integrative process.
On the wholesale telecommunications services market
cooperation – negotiations on the conditions of the in-
terconnection – is necessary (network ought to be inter-
connected) and due to unequal distributed negotiations
power – forced by the regulator. Our analysis of conver-
gence and opposition of aims of the players shows that
such cooperation may be – respectively to the form of pay-
off matrix and aims of the players – more or less “natural”,
simple to introducing. Intervention of regulator often stops
on the level of the way of setting a final solution: players
may and ought to negotiate a final solution. Sometimes
such intervention changes also the form of the payoff func-
tion (e.g., by changing the structure of the cost function,
or setting a limitations on the prices). However probably
newer such intervention changes the aims of the players. So
finally as course of cooperation so final result of a game
stays difficult to predict.
Probably the most unexpected conclusion of our analysis is
that in some cases cooperation between two players which
aims at antagonistic goals may be simpler then between
players which would like to play in an altruistic way. In
fact, under our definition antagonism does not should mean
malice of the players – though it might mean. Paradoxi-
cally, it is possible that some altruistic aims may express
the most malicious way of playing.
Generally as antagonism so altruism mean that the main
player’s aim is not objective, but relative: the player eval-
uates obtained outcome of his payoff function not as an
independent single criterion but in comparison to the other
player’s payoff function (double criteria of evaluation). In
this sens, a player which aims at realizing of an antagonis-
tic or altruistic goal doesn’t have to know the other player’s
aim (possibly also antagonistic or altruistic), what should
be necessary if he really aims at realizing malice (trying
to thwart another player’s plans) or kind (trying to help in
realizing another player’s plans) objective.
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